A. Newton-Kant-Einstein-Whitehead


                  1. Mind - completeness, consistency

                  2. Incarnational Model in history and nature

                  3. Ideology - source of value - finite system


B. Conceptual possibilities


                  1. Actual world - Goedel, Tarski

                  2. Historicism


C. Testing metaphysical Hermeneutic


                  1. Actual - common sense

                  2. True by consensus, correspondence, consistency



(Contemporary Models of Scientific Knowledge)


The following is a list of the propositions being presented:


I. Kant's Formulation Solution:


1.1            Immanuel Kant's philosophy represents the supreme attempt to establish a science of apodeictic certainty.

1.2            Kant's intention in the first critique is to establish scientific grounds for metaphysics.

1.3            Kant believed that there could not be social order without metaphysics.

1.4            Kant's demarcation is between speculative metaphysics on the one hand and scientific metaphysics on the other.


II. Popper's Formulation-Solution:


2.1            Science must be recognized as dependent upon metaphysics as compared with the exact reverse in Kant.

2.2            Karl Popper rejects the entire idea of a science of certainty.

2.3            Popper's entire philosophy must be seen as a critique of Kant's formulation-solution of the problem of demarcation.

2.4            The fundamental problem of contemporary philosophy is how there can be process without relativism.




                  In the opening sections of L.Sc.D., Sir Karl claims that Kant's problem was the problem of demarcation (*1-K. Popper, The Logic of Scientific Discovery (NY: Harper Torchbooks, 1959, 1968), p. 34.) The question immediately arises, How does Kant's formulation-solution to the problem differ from Popper's formulation-solution? Although I certainly have not read everything Popper has written, I have been unable to find any place where he explains his relationship to Kant regarding the problem of demarcation (*2-The most helpful section I have found thus far is in chp. 2 of Objective Knowledge (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1972,75), pp. 85-93. In this section Popper is trying to show that Kant misformulated "Hume's Problem." It is Popper's criticism that Kant formulated the problem in terms of the validation of causation, when he should have recognized that the problem of causation stemmed from the larger problem of induction. As a result of this misformulation, according to Popper, Kant's a-priori validation of causation became implicitly an a-priori validation of induction.) But in defense of both myself and Sir Karl, I would like to say that by the application of his very own method Popper himself would encourage us to go back to Kant's historical setting and assess that relationship for ourselves. Therefore, if after this paper is written someone points me to an obviously relevant pericope which I have missed, I will be grateful and indeed interested, but I will in no way be remorseful. We live in a time when the plethora of publication presents us with an almost insurmountable task. The only sensible solution to this problem is to apply some kind of "rational-critical razor" in order to cut to the heart of the debate as soon as possible. It is my hope that this paper can lay bare (for others as it has for me) a fundamental move in the history of thought, after which time it will have served its usefulness and will in turn be cut away by a more penetrating analysis.


                  In accordance with the question at hand this paper will consist of two parts: first, Kant's formulation-solution and second, Popper's formulation-solution.




                  I shall not in either part attempt to separate formulation and solution because I believe they are interdependent and inseparable. Rather, I shall present here an analysis of Kant's problem-situation in four propositions. As one further point of justification may I say that I am sure there are many great minds in our world that have already come to the conclusions I want to establish. At the same time I am also certain that there are some minds (perhaps even great mind) which have not. I have therefore structured the paper in terms of a few bold propositions which I consider to be testable and which can be quickly evaluated by those advanced to more penetrating analysis. Whether or not my analysis presented here is even worthy of constructive criticism can be determined only by making it public.


1.1 Kant's philosophy represents the supreme attempt to establish a science of apodeictic certainty. Sir Karl claims that both he himself and Kant accepted Hume's argument against induction as irrefutable. This being the case, Kant must reject the commonsense theory of knowledge. (*3-Ibid. If Kant can be said to admit the commonsense theory of knowledge, then we must at least qualify Kant's conception of commonsense knowledge recognizing that he attempted to establish a-priori the limits of sensations entering the bucket.) Popper, of course, calls this the "bucket theory of mind" and he himself rejects it as well. This rejection is a fundamental part of what Kant calls his "Copernican Revolution." What this means is simply that the objects of experience must conform to our cognition instead of our cognition conforming to the objects of experience (*4-Immanuel Kant, The Critique of Pure Reason, Trans., J.M.D. Meiklejohn Great Books of the Western World (Chicago: Wm. Benton, Pub., 1952.) The information in this section and the following sections I am taking primarily from the two prefaces, 1781 and 1787, pp. 1-13). This revolutionary shift immediately raises the problem of how Kant can be certain that his cognitions are in fact about the real world, i.e., how he can hold on to commonsense realism. The only solution available to Kant was to ground his science of apodeictic certainty in intuition. I say it was the only solution available to Kant because he presupposed the correctness of Newtonian cosmology. In order for Kant to maintain some kind of commonsense realism he must prescribe limits to human reason which he does by positing certain categories of a-priori experience--space and time. These prescribe the limits of human reason because they are intuitively certain. Kant admits that the intuitive foundation for his apodeictic certainty necessitates the distinction between "things in themselves" and "things as phenomena." Thus it would be Popper's criticism of Kant that his intuitionism after all necessitated the forfeiture of commonsense realism, for things can be known only as phenomena. The world of phenomena is the limit of certainty; it is the limit of science.           


1.2 Kant's intention in the first critique is to establish scientific grounds for metaphysics. Here Kant is not primarily concerned with legitimizing science. This he considered accomplished as early as 1770 in his Latin dissertation where he established the a-priori intuitive character of space and time. Rather, what the first critique represents (as a fundamental part of his "Copernican Revolution") is a metathesis of metaphysics and science. The science of certainty must be prior to metaphysics. This is Kant's attempt to solve the problem of dogmatic speculation in metaphysics (*5-Ibid., p. 11; "Dogmatism is thus the dogmatic procedure of pure reason without previous criticism of its own powers, and in opposing this procedure, we must not be supposed to lend any countenance to that loquacious shallowness which arrogates to itself the name of popularity, nor yet to scepticism, which makes short work with the whole science of metaphysics. On the contrary, our criticism is the necessary preparation for a thoroughly scientific system of metaphysics. . ." It is clear from this that Kant is not a positivist in the sense of being anti-metaphysical. What he is rather opposed to, and vehemently so, is dogmatic speculation in metaphysics. However, it can be said that Kant's effect on the history of thought was very different from his intention. Popper makes this very claim in his second volume of The Open Society and Its Enemies (Princeton: NY: Princeton University Press, 1962, 1971), p. 31: "Kant's intention was to stop once and forever the 'accursed fertility' of the scribblers on metaphysics. But unfortunately, the effect was very different. What Kant stopped was only the attempts of scribblers to use rational argument; they only gave up the attempt to teach, but not the attempt to bewitch the public (as Schopenhauer puts it). For this development, Kant himself undoubtedly bears a very considerable share of the blame; for the obscure style of his work (which he wrote in a great hurry, although only after long years of meditation) contributed considerably to a further lowering of he low standard of clarity in German theoretical writing." Incidentally, Popper goes on to say that none of the "metaphysical scribblers" which followed Kant made any attempt to refute him.) Before we talk about that, however, let us ask a further question: Why did Kant want to even justify metaphysics at all?


1.3 Kant believed that there could not be social order without metaphysics. Throughout the 18th century, French philosophers, as a result of Voltaire's translation of Newton, had been trying to apply mathematics to the generation of social and political theory. This move is connected with the thesis, developed by La Mettire, that man as well as the cosmos, is only a machine. If man is only a machine then an adequate social-political theory is a mathematical problem, certainly not a metaphysical problem (given of course the justification of Newtonian cosmology).

                  Kant was aware of these developments, as well as the fact that there had already been one major revolution (the American in 1777). Further, the change in tone between the preface to the first critique in 1781 and the preface to the second edition in 1787 is an indication that Kant considered conditions in France to be even nearer to revolution. Observe that in the preface to the first edition (1781) Kant gives only logistical reasons for writing in such an obscure manner. However, i the preface to the second edition (1787) there are some very high level social and political assumptions in defense of his scholastic obscurantism:


      "This can never become popular and, indeed, has no occasion to be so; for finespun arguments in favour of useful truths make just as little impression on the public mind as the equally subtle objections brought against these truths. On the other hand, since both inevitably force themselves on every man who rises to the height of speculation, it becomes the manifest duty of the schools to enter upon a thorough investigation of the rights of speculative reason and, thus, to prevent the scandal which metaphysical controversies are sure, sooner or later, to cause even to the masses. It is only by criticism that metaphysicians (and, as such, theologians, too) can be saved from these controversies and from the consequent perversion of their doctrines. Criticism alone can strike a blow at the root of materialism, fatalism, atheism, free-thinking, fanaticism, and superstition, which are universally injurious--as well as of idealism and scepticism, which are dangerous to the schools, but can scarcely pass over to the public. If governments think proper to interfere with the affairs of the learned, it would be more consistent with a wise regard for the interests of science, as well as for those of society, to favour a criticism of this kind, by which alone the labours of reason can be established on a firm basis, than to support the ridiculous despotism of the schools, which raise a loud cry of danger to the public over the destruction of cobwebs, of which the public has never taken any notice, and the loss of which, there fore, it can never feel." (*6-Kant, Pure Reason, p. 31)


                  There are at least two assumptions which we want to explicate from this pericope. First, the class of the enlightened arises out of the masses and to this class belongs the responsibility of mediating a metaphysic that will preserve the social order. Secondly, Kant clearly asserts that reason alone is capable of defending the social order against destructive forces, such as materialism, fatalism, atheism, etc. Historically this entire move is falsifiable because an elitist view of truth (to which Kant's social strategy reduces, i.e., the reason of an autonomous enlightened class), has never been successful against the proliferation of revolutionary propaganda. Sir Karl correctly criticizes Kant's intentional obscurantism as a fundamental mistake in social strategy.


                  But is this is true we must look in some other direction for an answer to the question, Why was Germany successful in avoiding revolution on the order of that in France? If Kant's obscurantism worked, it worked for the wrong reason. Recall that Luther had already been successful in establishing a metaphysic among the masses (which was perhaps far more socially stabilizing than Kant's to begin with). If Kant's obscurantism worked it worked precisely because it failed to undermine the metaphysic that already stabilized the German masses. The French masses had been untouched by the Lutheran revolution and thus received revolutionary propaganda with open arms (*7-Compare Popper's criticism which I have quoted in note 5 above. I admit that my analysis is different than Popper's but I am not sure at this point that they are necessarily opposed to one another.)

                  To this critique of Kant I would like to make an addition, although it is entirely possible that Popper or someone else has already made the observation. Kant's metaphysic failed in its broader historical implementations because he failed to defend the assumption that man is more than a machine. As I have already mentioned, this assumption (at Kant's time) had not been held by the French mathematician-sociologists since the beginning of the 18th century. Further, it is my thesis, which I shall not discuss in this paper, that the entire search for rigor in the philosophy of mathematics throughout the 19th century and up to the time Goedel published his completeness and consistency proofs, can be attributed to the rejection of the assumption that man is more than a machine. If man is only a machine then social order does not require a metaphysic, but instead, a rigorously defined philosophy of mathematics. Only on this basis can one explain why all metaphysical notions were later rejected by Marx, Freud and the Vienna Circle, which must be understood in order to bring us to Popper's problem situation.


1.4 Kant's demarcation is between speculative metaphysics on the one hand, and scientific metaphysics on the other. In the preface to the first edition of Critique of Pure Reason Kant identifies the horns of his dilemma as dogmatism (of a Leibnitzian sort) and scepticism (of a Humean sort). One can move by inference from Kant's concern for social order to his problem of demarcation. I have tried in this first part of the paper to locate the major elements of Kant's formulation-solution and shall now turn by comparison to Popper's problem-situation.         




                  As I have just rehearsed, Kant's philosophy, by presupposing the science of certainty as prior to metaphysics, prepared the way for the ultimate rejection of all metaphysical notions. For the sake of brevity and clarity as well, I shall at this point presuppose, on the part of my audience a general understanding of Popper's response to the Vienna Circle. I have therefore considered it sufficient to consign to a footnote a brief summary of that relationship. (#8-Any understanding of the relationship must begin by recognizing that The Logic of Scientific Discovery is fundamentally a critique of the language analysts. Popper makes this unmistakeably clear in the preface to the first edition and the preface to the first English edition. It is his criticism that the reduction of philosophical problems to linguistic problems necessitates the forfeiture of any kind of meaningful cosmological investigation. In light of this we must concede to Popper's persistent repudiation of his critics who tried to conceive his falsification as a new kind of meaningfulness criterion. For a summary see the following: Bryan Magee, Karl Popper (NY: The Viking Press, 1973); Karl Popper, Conjectures and Refutations (NY: Harper Torchbooks, 1963), chp. 11, "The Demarcation Between Science and Metaphysics;" Paul Schilpp, ed., The Library of Living Philosophers: The Philosophy of Karl Popper (LaSalle, IL: Open Court, 1974), "Replies to My Critics," by Karl Popper.) This, then, brings us to Popper's similarity as well as his fundamental difference to Kant. Specifically I want to set Popper in relation to Kant's two revolutionary shifts: the metathesis of metaphysics and science and the metathesis of experience and thought. Then I will discuss a further revolutionary shift Popper proposes.


2.1 Science must be recognized as dependent upon metaphysics as compared with the exact reverse in Kant. In other words, Popper is reversing one of the fundamental aspects of Kant's "Copernican Revolution." This comparison between Kant and Popper makes it quite clear that Sir Karl's proposal was never anything like that of the Vienna Circle, for no positivist would ever have accounted to metaphysics the fundamental position it has acquired in Popper's philosophy. This should have been clear from the opening sections of the Logic of Scientific Discovery, yet it seems that the great minds of that period insisted on misinterpreting him.


                  Popper's response to Kant's metathesis of metaphysics and science seems clear enough, but what about his response to Kant's metathesis of experience and cognition? This is precisely the part of Kant's philosophy which must be maintained, (*9-K. Popper, Objective Knowledge Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1972) for I have already mentioned that both of these mental giants accept Hume's criticism of induction and the consequent rejection of the commonsense theory of knowledge.


                  This seems to me the proper place to discuss Popper's relationship to Thomas S. Kuhn. The issue of historicism was precisely the issue between Kant and Hegel. Kant tried desperately to defend the conditions he thought necessary and sufficient to accomplish the task. Hegel responded negatively--there are no rational elements that transcend historical boundaries. But even here it seems that Hegel still tried to defend a science of certainty. I think we can identify a couple developments in this direction for which Hegel provided the groundwork. First, Hegel began the tradition (die Geisteswissenchaften) which has tried desperately to establish a method of identifying historical boundaries. For example, Marx tried to accomplish the task by a critique of economy; Wittgenstein tried to accomplish the task by a critique of language (*10-While it may be argued that Wittgenstein was not in the Hegelian tradition as was Marx, it seemed to me possible to demonstrate some definite connections Wittgenstein has with historicism. I have tentatively concluded this from Karl-Otto Apel's Analytic Philosophy of Language and the Geisteswissenschaften, tr. Harald Holstelilie (Netherlands: D. Reidel, 1967). Apel considers the work of Peter Winch in The Idea of a Social Science and Its Relation to Philosophy (London: 1958). He says that Winch argues with Wittgenstein for the linguistic constitution of objects in a social setting, and against Wittgenstein that philosophy is the science of the a-priori forms for understanding reality.). Secondly, it seems that once one admits the necessity of historical boundaries for human reason, there no longer exists any insurmountable obstacles to the justification of inductive processes. Clearly, this is Kuhn's position, for he admits the necessity of both induction and deduction. However, he also maintains that these processes are valid only within historical boundaries. Thus, Kuhn tries to justify historical boundaries, in the Hegelian tradition, by his critique of science. This is the significance of his concept of paradigm (*11-T.S. Kuhn,, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Chicago,IL: University of Chicago Press, 1962, 1970), p. 171: "If we learn to substitute evolution-from-what-we-do-know for evolution-toward-what-we-wish-to-know, a number of vexing problems may vanish in the process. Somewhere in this maze, for example, must lie the problem of induction." This quote is taken from chp. 13, "Progress Through Revolutions," which is Kuhn's speculative philosophy of history. This quote actually implies that the problem of induction finds its solution in the abandonment of the idea of objective knowledge. The only alternative Kuhn has to offer is to confine induction to the limits of paradigms.)


                  It is exactly the issue of historicism that separates Kuhn and Popper as it did Kant and Hegel. Kuhn's synthesis represents a high point in the development of the Hegelian tradition in the fact that it is a critique of science. This explains why the debate in the philosophy of science has come to the full development it has in these two men. There is little possibility of these two philosophers coming to agreement, for there is no mutually acceptable middle ground concerning the issue of historicism. This is clear from their statements in Criticism and The Growth of Knowledge (*12-Karl Popper, "Normal Science and Its Dangers," in Lakatos and Musgrave, eds., Criticism and The Growth of Knowledge (Cambridge University Press, 1970), p. 56: "I should like to indicate briefly why I am not a relativist--I do believe in 'absolute' or 'objective' truth, in Tarski's sense (although I am, of course, not an 'absolutist' in the sense of thinking that I, or anybody else, has the truth in his pocket). I do not doubt that this is one of the points on which we are most deeply divided; and it is a logical point.")


                  I now return to my comparison of Popper and Kant. Before I move into my next proposal, however, I want to summarize this section in order to maintain in transition the important connection between 2.1 and 2.2. First, I have rehearsed the fact that Popper's philosophy represents a very important revolutionary shift in the relationship between science and metaphysics. In doing this I have claimed, and I think justifiably so, that Popper is more fundamentally related to Kant than anything the Vienna Circle tried to do. Secondly, I have argued that Kant was attempting to avoid historicism. In doing this, I have discussed transcendental elements. I have identified this reaction against the historicization of reason as a major element of both men's philosophy. The question which now arises is, How is Popper's solution to the problem of historicism different from Kant's? This brings me to the second revolutionary shift in Popper's philosophy.


2.2           Popper Rejects the Entire Idea of a Science of Certainty. Before I discuss this in relation to Kant, I first need to discuss why I believe the abandonment of the search for apodeictic certainty in the sciences is unique to Popper. I am well aware of the fact that Popper is not the first in the history of thought to suggest that certainty is a quality not to be found among any of the human disciplines. But I am also aware of the fact that Popper is the first to hold to and to defend the two following premises simultaneously:


                  1. There are no sources of apodeictic certainty.

                  2. There is, nevertheless, a rational continuity to be found in the growth of human knowledge.


                  No other man in the history of human thought has been as successful in holding both of these premises as has Karl Popper. His philosophic system advances so far beyond any of their systems in its attempt to deal with this problem that it will merit careful study for many generations.


                  As further justification for this claim, let us compare Popper with his famous opponent. Kuhn actually holds to the negation of both of these premises. I have already argued that he holds to the idea of certainty within paradigmatic, i.e., historical boundaries. I will also argue that he is unable (even if he is willing) to defend rational continuity in the growth of human knowledge (*13-T.S. Kuhn, "Logic of Discovery or Psychology of Research?" in Lakatos and Musgrave, Criticism..., p. 1. In Structure...Kuhn holds that between paradigms the data are themselves different, implying that logical structure resides in the paradigm; in this opening article he speaks of a "pool of shared data," implying that he may be ready to admit some kind of logical structure exterior to the paradigm.)


                  Later in the paper I will return to this revolutionary aspect of Popper's philosophy. In the remainder of this section I want to discuss the relationship between Kant's philosophy and Popper's rejection of apodeictic certainty in the sciences.


                  Earlier I discussed the intuitive character of Kant's transcendental elements. I argued that Kant proposed to avoid the problem of historical boundaries, or perhaps I should say the boundaries of human experience, by founding a science of certainty on intuition. Popper is quite vehement in rejecting Kant's a-priori intuition. His criticism of the intuitionist mathematics of Kant and Brouwer is most helpful at this point (*14-Popper, Objective Knowledge, chp. 3, "Epistemology Without A Knowing Subject.") Two observations from that criticism are sufficient for my purposes. First, not only was the idea of intuitive space refuted by non-Euclidian Geometry, the idea of intuitive time was refuted as well by special relativity. Secondly, the structure of mathematical objects is dependent upon linguisticization, and thus, the structure of language must be an element of the third world because the objectivity of any science is contingent upon the "criticability of its arguments."


                  With Kant's transcendental elements so mortally wounded, how does Popper propose to transcend the limits of human experience? I suggest that he propose his own transcendental element, falsification. However, Popper's transcendental element must be recognized as not only different from Kant's but also as performing a different function as well. Kant's was to ground a science of certainty; Popper's is a method of advancing beyond the limits of human experience. For Popper, transcendence is only emergent. Out of the limits of human experience a man proposes a theory from which he deduces possible falsifying particulars. Once this is done a search can be conducted beyond the limits of experience for the falsifying particulars. I will return to this later, but first I must conclude my comparison of Kant and Popper by returning to the central issue of this paper, demarcation.


2.3 Sir Karl Popper's Entire Philosophy Must Be Seen As A Critique of Kant's Formulation-Solution of the Problem of Demarcation. The reason for this is to found in the fact that both men attach ultimate significance to metaphysics. Kant saw metaphysics as indispensable to social order. Popper, in contrast, sees metaphysics as indispensable to science, to human knowledge, indeed, to all of human existence. For a long time I was puzzled as to why Popper so often referred to his solution to the problem of demarcation as perhaps the most important element in his philosophy. Indeed, I was unable to understand at all why his philosophy had caused such a furor in the scientific and academic world in the first place. Now that I see his relationship to Immanuel Kant, I am no longer confused on either of these questions.


                  It was the burden of the first part of this paper to show that Kant formulated the problem in terms of demarcating between speculative metaphysics (i.e., dogmatism or positivism) on the one hand and scientific metaphysics on the other hand. Kant saw in his science of certainty and Newtonian cosmology the possible recourse to an a-priori solution to the problem. It has been the burden of part two to show that Popper, particularly as a result of Einsteinian philosophy of science (i.e., the refutation of intuitive space and time), has no recourse to an a-priori solution to the problem. For this reason Popper formulates the problem in terms of demarcating between metaphysical assertions which are testable and metaphysical assertions which are not testable, and proposes falsification as the solution. As a result of his rejection of an a-priori solution, Popper is forced to recognize a problem which Kant did not recognize; the problem of relativism. This brings me to the concluding section.


2.4 The Fundamental Problem of Post Modern Philosophy Is How There Can Be Process Without Relativism. Whereas Kant did not have the problem of relativism because he had recourse to his intuitive a-priori, Popper must face relativism precisely because he has no intuitive a-priori. In this final section I want to draw attention to Thomas Kuhn's criticism of Popper on this very issue. In response to the problem of relativism Popper proposes falsification as the transcendental element by which human knowledge moves out beyond the boundaries of human experience, and thus extends those boundaries. I suggest that this is the very move Kuhn is criticizing in a section from his paper in Lakatos and Musgrave, Criticism and The Growth of Knowledge. He says that while Popper is not a "naive falsificationist," he may for all practical purposes be treated as one. (*15-Lakatos and Musgrave, eds., p. 14) It seems to be the essence of Kuhn's critique that although Popper's falsification proposal is unique in that it is a transcendental element for the advancement of human knowledge, he still has the problem of relativism because the infinite extension of any purely emergent truth function (even falsification) reduces to the problem of induction. (See my paper, "Kuhn's Concept of Paradigm" located in the Lincoln Christian College library.)


                  I conclude that Kuhn's criticism of Popper is essentially justified. Transcendence of an emergent sort is an undeniable reality, which Popper summarizes in the following schematic:


The scientist begins with a problem for which he proposes a tentative theory. From this tentative theory he proceeds to eliminate error by the application of rational criticism. The termination of the cycle is the identification of a second problem, with which the cycle begins all over again. Popper clearly says that this process is infinite (*16-Popper, Objective Knowledge, chps. 3 and 4). Because of its power to provide a rational explanation of history, I think we must conclude with Popper that there is some kind of emergent transcendence observable in history. This powerful demonstration even seems to have given Kuhn second thoughts as I have observed earlier. At the same time I think we must also conclude with Kuhn that, at any one point in history, the instantaneous evaluation of Popper's process always leaves us with only inductive grounds for epistemic conclusions because it is always in the shadow of an infinite extrapolation. Accordingly, the following response can be made to both Kuhn and Popper, to both the Hegelian tradition and the Kantian tradition: If there are no non-emergent sources of transcendence, then there is no solution to the problem of relativism.


                  (See my papers "Post Modern Anti-Science Movement," "Narrative Displacement in The Development of Western Science," and my critique of "Sociology of Knowledge Thesis" located in the Lincoln Christian College library.)


                                                                                                                              Dr. James D. Strauss

                                                                                                                              Professor Emeritus

                                                                                                                              Lincoln Christian Seminary

                                                                                                                              Lincoln, IL 62656