THOMAS KUHN’S SCIENCE AS A SYSTEM OF TRADITIONAL AUTHORITY
The two major concepts of Kuhn’s thesis are: (1) His attack on the Positivistic View of Scientific Change and (2) His notion of A Paradigm. These concepts involve significant departures from the Mertonian Sociology of Science.
Positivism treats tradition and science as natural enemies. Tradition and beliefs and practices exercise a magical power over men which protect them from the critical appraisal of common sense (e.g., contra cultural/epistemological relativism of post modern multiculturalism). Science demystifies tradition and penetrates the enchanted defenses of tradition and exposes its cognitive and technical absurdities (see my essays, “Search For True Truth in Cyberspace,” “The Terrorism of Truth: Truth/Theory in Post Modern Epistemology,” and “Attacks on Science as Merely a Eurocentric Operation”). The post modern cry against science is “Cultural Imperialism.” Merton breaks down this tradition/science antithesis. (1) On the one hand, he underlines the “reasonableness” of traditional beliefs and practices by looking beyond their cognitive and technical failure to their “expressive” and “functional” success, i.e., their success is giving expression to profound non-logical sentiments and in contributing to the maintenance of social order. (2) On the other hand, while accepting the rationality of science as a system for producing knowledge in conformity to a fixed logic of procedure, he breaks with positivism by asserting that as a social system, science is governed by a non-logical normative tradition (e.g., presuppositions, world views, narratives, legitimization structures).
Kuhn adopts a more radical position. He questions what Merton, no less than the positivists, simply takes for granted; that the cognitive development of science is a rational process governed by timeless (and cross-cultural) rules of procedure. In fact, he denies that such standards exist and maintains that the practice of science is monitored not by universal rules but by “local” tradition of thought which defines for a particular group of practitioners precisely what problems, methods, or theories are to count as scientific, and where the boundaries of their scientific authority are to be drawn.
Where Merton directs sociologists’ attention to the normative tradition governing scientific behavior as such, Kuhn is concerned with the socio-psychological processes through which specific authoritative tradition of scientific thought and practice are established, perpetuated, elaborated, and in time, undermined and displaced (e.g., Narrative Displacement). Central to this task is his notion of a paradigm, a tradition, defining piece of scientific work to which a community of scientists is connected. What is the nature of the authority exercised by or through the paradigm? How is it exercised? And how does it come to be overthrown? These appear to be the questions which drew Kuhn’s analysis of the structure of scientific growth into contact with sociological thought. Notice that contact is made as a positive force, namely politics, law, and religion, rather than the “liberated” or “rationalized” field of economics.
Any account of the sociological significance of Kuhn’s work must, then, center upon his critique of the rationalistic view of science (i.e., Positivism) and his idea of a paradigm as a repository of scientific authority. He has been heavily attacked on both of these issues--chiefly from philosophers of science (Imre Lakatos, “Criticism and Methodology of Scientific Research Programmers,” Proceedings of The Aristotelian Society, 45,60 (1968-69); Dudley Shapere’s review of The Structures of Scientific Revolution, Philosophical Review 73 (1964), pp. 383-394). It is in the last resort a non-rational social act, an act of faith likened by Kuhn to a religious conversion (i.e., Gestalt, radical change, Nature of Science: Methodology: History of, Psychology of, Sociology of).
Kuhn insists that choices between alternative world views are not in the last analysis rational; he seeks to show that they are nonetheless progressive. Having cut himself loose from the notion that progressiveness of science is rooted in its logical character or in its methodology, Kuhn seeks to show that it is guaranteed or at least virtually guaranteed by its social character by the nature of science as a social system. For him, the final constraint upon scientific choice is social rather than a logical choice; the final arbiter is the professional judgment of the scientific community. “What better criterion than the decision of the scientific group could there be?” (Kuhn, Structure of The Scientific Revolution. p. 169) Yet the scientific community has development on the logical foundations of science, e.g., History of? Yet narrative displacement has repeatedly taken place within the received paradigm --simply because “new data” became available that was not available in articulating the older paradigm, e.g., Greek atomism and post modern physics, Euclidian geometry and Riemannian geometry, Aristotlean cosmology and the cosmology of Kepler, Boyle, Newton, etc. The Einsteinian revolution along with Plank, Heisenberg, et.al., Crick and Monad in genetics (the Gene Code)--each of these radical shifts in science were precipitated by the logical implications of new data. After all, science seeks to explain, not merely describe, data!
Commitment and scientific merit are distinguishable. Commitment is a “state of mind” which can be attributed to a particular individual or group at a particular point of time; it is a socio-psychological fact. Scientific justification, on the other hand, is recognized by a particular group as an attribute, whether judged by absolute or relative standards. Positivism (Scientism) is a theory of science which by equating recognized merit with truth and supposing that scientists commit themselves only to what is judged to be true in terms of social standards of truth, makes a sociology of scientific commitment simply superfluous. Kuhn, in contrast, wishes to abandon the idea of truth as an absolute, to anchor judgment of the relative merits of scientific theories and therefore the progressiveness of conceptual changes in the conviction of he scientific community, and so to use a sociology of scientific commitment as a foundation for, or even a substitute for, a theory of knowledge.
Perhaps we can learn from Kuhn’s concept of paradigmatic revolution without using it to find answers to epistemological questions. For even sociological theories entail an epistemological foundation. There is no escape from logic--in mathematics, history, sociology, science, etc., without this conscious awareness we are operating on of one of Bacon’s Idols. There can be no “community, scientific or cultural, without “convictions”, conscious or unconscious. (World Views in conflict, 7,000 languages and Wittgenstein’s “language game”; see my paper, “Pike and Nida’s Theory of Tagmemics) Provided only that it is conceded that as a matter of historical fact, scientists in the last instance dictated by explicit a-social standards of judgments, then room is left for a sociological account of the processes by which changing patterns of consensus are formed and reformed (Lakatos, et.al., ibid., p. 169); and Kuhn, Structure of Scientific Revolution).
The force of Kuhn’s sociological analysis of scientific change is greatly weakened when he utilizes it to rescue his thesis from the epistemological difficulties which arises out of his denial of the claim that scientific choices are dictated by impersonal, i.e., a social standards. Here is the pivotal weakness and justification of Stanley Jaki’s criticism of Kuhn’s paradigm--the Sociology of Knowledge position, i.e., cannot escape the relativism charge. In other words, he directs it toward finding a Social Explanation for the overall progressiveness of science rather than to the task of eliminating the process through which actual historical instances of conceptual change impress themselves upon a scientific group. Kuhn’s sociology throws him off its course by his treatment of this question of progressiveness.
Kuhn’s Paradigm and The Sociology of Knowledge Thesis
In our journey through the thought of Weber, Merton, Parsons, Hall, et.al., we have attempted to make explicit the foundation of The Sociology of Knowledge, i.e., cultural and epistemological relativism. (Note: See Strauss bibliography on Relativism in LCC/S Library; also my paper, “Sociology of Knowledge Thesis: The Social Misconstruction of Reality; and Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann, The Social Construction of Reality: A Treatise in The Sociology of Knowledge (Doubleday Anchor Books, 1966). Relativistic social construction has entered the scientific maze of explanation through Kuhn’s influential work, the most referenced work in the past forty years. How can science guarantee progress? It has been suggested that we utilize sociological jurisprudence, namely, the distinction between declared laws and the “living law,” that is law as it is actually practiced in the courts and taught in Law Schools. (See W. Friedmann, Legal Theory, 4th edition (1960), chp. 23; and my paper, “Narrative Displacement in Law from Greek Natural Law, Biblical Law, Interpreted Law of the Sociology of Law (Harvard Law School) and influence of the pragmatism of William James and John Dewey (Legal Theorists and American Realists/Pragmatists). Note the foundation of Pop Culture/Counter Culture in Educational Theories and Media influence. From these developments we enter the culture of victimology in courts, music, education, the pragmatism in the Church Growth Movement, e.g., Methods of Mega Churches, Cultural Wars, Worship Wars and Homiletics Wars, etc., Education Wars, Multicultural Pluralism, revisionist history, anti science movement, terrorism and tolerance, cultural diversity, etc.)
Kuhn concentrates in “The Living Law Model” (Sociology of Law) rather than from the operation of methodological canon of the kind enunciated by Positivists and Social Construction of Ideas Thesis such as Weber, Parson, Merton, et.al. Kuhn’s choice of a sociology of law puts him in a very precarious position from explaining Narrative Displacement/Paradigmatic Revolution in the historical development of science. Because the Sociology of Law models of Holmes and Friedmann, et.al. was grounded in the relativism of Weber, Friedmann, Parson, Merton, et.al.
In the history of narrative displacements, the West rejected the Judaeo/Christian metanarrative and replaced it in a naturalistic, humanistic secularism world view. This phenomena is revealed in the philosophy of Hume to Kant to the scientific revolution of Galileo, Kepler, Newton, et.al., fused with the Darwinian biological model displaced the classical Judaeo/Christian narrative as irrational superstition and placed in the category of Western and Eastern pantheistic mythology. The relativistic social model is the pillar of the development from Kant’s religion within the boundary of reason to the social sciences development and extended into the new disciplines of The History of Religion, Comparative Religion, Sociology of Religion, Psychology of Religion, Phenomenology of Religion and through Nietzsche’s “Death of God” Thesis. God was marginalized and was emphatically placed in Freudian projection theory (cf. Freud claims that the Modern Mind derives from the ideas of Copernicus, Newton and Freud).
The first attack on the Judaeo/Christian Narrative was in the development of Astronomy, then Physics, Chemistry, Biology, Zoology, Geology, and Psychology; then the hermeneutical revolution, etc.. The Western mind has not recovered from Humean attack on miracles, etc. We moved from a closed world to the open world of Hegelian, Darwinian revolutions--the history of science must be undertaken as an autonomous discipline; it develops in the context revolution in physics and mathematics (Goedel’s theory) and these disciplines are also not autonomous. Newtonian world view was displaced by Mach, Einstein, Planck, Heisenberg, et.al., but we should never forget that it was special explanatory power of the scientific revolution that was utilized in every category at the Academy, as long as the Judaeo/Christian God as the creator-redeemer was the ground of all categories we could rationally have a University but in our post modern maize we can only have a multiversity with no ground for the function of education except to provide for the work force for global economy. Big Brother has arrived (Orwell’s book, 1984 is present in our post modern culture.
The new relativism appears in the multicultural curriculum of our pluralistic vestiges where True Truth is denied, leaving only power struggles between alternative tribal customs. There is no metanarrative to judge the terrorists. What is terrorism to one group is patriotism to another (see “Terrorism in The Temple of Tolerance” since 9.11.01) The Sociology of Law was more interested in life (pragmatism/utility) than in logic. The new Holmesian method (pure pragmatism) became preoccupied in studying the sociology of the legal profession, than by exhibiting the structure of legal reasoning. (Law has only four possible grounds: (1) Creator, personal God; (2) Greek, Eternal Natural Law and (3) The Sociology of Law; (4) Law merely reflects that we are rapidly moving to a post modern Gomorrah. “Everyone does what is right in his own eyes,” i.e., cultural chaos!
Kuhn’s scientist begins to look very much like the legal realists judge; a man engaged in the interpretation, laboratories, modification and even on occasions, overthrow of a professional tradition of practice, rather than an automation whose actualities are finally monitored by a fixed inexorable logic. This is a very serious flawed model from interpreting scientific narrative displacement. Sociology law does not necessarily entail a sociological critique of science. The cultural relativism thesis present in the Sociology of Law is no proof for the Sociological Relativism and narrative displacement in science.
The conceptual schemes of Weber, Merton, Parson, Friedmann, et.al. (Cultural relativism thesis, every culture is its own interpreter) cannot survive the history of scientific narrative displacement. The sciences of physics, chemistry (medicine), mathematics, etc., might be culturally specific, but not culture bound. There is, in fact, cross-cultural communication from Science to our multicultural global village residents. Kuhn vainly attempts to escape Weber’s and Merton’s cultural relativism by his concept of paradigm and to use his concept of paradigm to deny the rationality of science is not necessary to deny its progressiveness. Kuhn contends that his research tradition springs from what he calls “paradigms.” But critics of Kuhn have insisted that his concept of paradigm is extremely ambiguous (see esp. D. Shapere’s review of “Structures of Scientific Revolutions” in Philosophical Review, 73, esp. P. 385; and Stephen Toulmin’s “Conceptual Revolutions in Science” Boston Studies in The Philosophy of Science, ed. By R.S. Cohen and M.W. Wartosky, (Dordrecht, 1967, III, 337-341).
Kuhn acknowledges that he extends tradition to paradigm and communities that hold for a certain period of time, but each is destined eventually to be discarded. Kuhn puts it “Those who subscribe to alternative, incommensurable paradigms are bound to talk past each other.” (Kuhn, Structure of Scientific Revolution, p. 147)
Surely this picture of science must raise doubts about its overall progressiveness; if “normal” science progresses because scientists submit to being governed by a paradigm, what guarantee is there that changes from one paradigm to another, one “idiom” to another, will also be progressive? This is a crucial challenge to Kuhn’s concept of the progressiveness of paradigms. Science as a what fact may progress, but it is by or because of Kuhn’s explanation of paradigmatic revolutions. Kuhn strongly demarcated between “normal and extraordinary science , but how and why? Kuhn’s explanation of paradigmatic evolutions by “gestalt-switches” or religious conversions; they are intrusions into normality (Received View) then outgrowth from it.
Kuhn’s scientists are thorough going “constitutionalists. They are reformers, not revolutionaries. They are devoted to finding solutions to process within the framework of the received view, e.g., tradition of thought, not to understand its foundations. Scientific revolutions may be intellectually monotonous affairs, but socially they generally prove to be innocuous. But science has no stomach for disorder. The new puzzle solving communities leave behind only the limited capacity of the received view (e.g., Euclid has not been refuted but modified by Riemannian Geometry; Newton’s equations have only been modified by Einstein, not refuted! Muslim scientists still employ Newtonian equations
The intellectual discontinuity of the paradigm switch is compensated for by the continuity of the “political culture.” Their paramount commitment is to unanimity and to normality. Therein lies the final guarantee by the progressiveness of scientific revolution. Scientists will not entertain a new way of doing science unless it can produce consensus and normality. Lakatos’ attack on Kuhn ‘as mob psychology’ is probably a bit too harsh. (I. Lakatos, “Criticism and The Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes,” op.cit., p. 181)
Kuhn’s epistemological position is inseparable from Merton’s relativistic sociological position. Kuhn escapes Merton’s relativistic web by his appeal to “paramount values,” i.e., presuppositions, which finally are no less abstract and historical than Merton’s logic of procedure. This seems to be a serious flaw by bending sociology for epistemological reasons to an “essentialist” or “necessasarian view of science with the aim of catching its spirit or driving force and so explaining its progressiveness. Both Merton and Kuhn make the serious mistake of equating an account or meaning of science (describing it) with an explanation of its historical development over a particular period of time.
Kuhn’s original conception that the day of any practice of science is governed by concrete research traditions, by “living law,” rather than by abstract rules, values or essences. This opens the field to sociological inquiry. This raised the point of the relationship of theory, hypothesis to scientific investigation. Science must choose special data from a world of data for scientific analysis; this will always require assumption or presupposition to begin the investigation. Kuhn employs the notion of scientific authority, rational or traditional, intellectual or social, as the key-linking concept.
Both Kuhn and Merton sought via sociology of science, to be dictated by the problem of finding a social basis for the rationality or, as in Kuhn’s case, the progressiveness of science. They have been forced to assert that the scientists’ ultimate commitment is to a set of highly abstract values which are supposed, generate or confirm a constant mode of life which remains undisrupted by change in scientific thought. Historically, the development of the scientific method had little or no connections with “values” Ultimately, the reverse, to the extent that scientists are represented as being able to alter their patterns of thought and practice without doing violence to these ultimate commitments, scientific changes appear to be unproblematic. Scientific values come to be seen as a kind of frame within which any scientific picture of the world can be fitted without strain. For Merton such a picture is found to fit, because the frame was preferred to accommodate the products of rational scientific activity; for Kuhn it fits, because only pictures that do fit count as science.
Epistemologically a spontaneous alignment between scientific values, practices, and thought is to deny oneself the means of comprehending the real course of scientific change. Perhaps this entails a kind of “epistemological agnosticism,” similar to the attitude taken by Peter Berger in his sociology of religion. This process could give sociologists the opportunity of developing the kind of approach that serves more to illuminate actual historical processes of change in the patterns of thought, mode of practice, and social situation of scientists then to meet the demands of epistemology. Kuhn’s Structure of Scientific Revolutions sketches out this approach. Philosophers of Science have consistently criticized Kuhn for this approach, as science does not progress according to historical (of narrative displacement) or sociological (conditions) analysis. These approaches merely describe what practices scientists actually accomplish. Kuhn fails to present convincing analysis of the internal structures of scientific revolutions; indeed it concedes that they are intrinsically unanalizeable events by likening them to Gestalt switches or sets of religious conversion. As a result Kuhn does not succeed in developing a Sociological Theory of scientific change. He fails to do so because he begins at the outset by separating scientific growth into “distinct” phrases. In periods of “normal science,” scientists basic commitments--conceptual, methodological, technical--are virtually constant. During a paradigm shift there is “complete” narrative displacement,” but historically this has not always been the case.
Sociologists, theologians, et.al., should not expect to find in Kuhn’s work a ready made theory of scientific change. Kuhn has shown the authority structures of science that uphold them, that they are modified, disrupted, and perhaps overthrown in the faces of changes in scientific thought and technique. All real paradigmatic shifts stem from World View Structure, not merely the accumulation of new data. There are always presuppositions of data selection before scientific scrutiny can be proposed (see esp. Steve Fuller, Philosophy of Science and Its Discontents (NY: Guilford Press, 1993); and M.D. King, “Reason, Translation and The Progressiveness of Science,” History and Theory, vol. X, nu. 1, 1971, pp. 3-32); Richard J. Bernstein, “The Rage Against Reason” Philosophy and Literature. (pp. 187-210).
The area of study is crucial for understanding the entire development of Multiculturalism, Diversity and Tolerance syndrome of our post modern culture. All forms of classial thought “assumed” the possibility of “objectivity,” i.e., the observer did not ‘necessarily shape the data under scrutiny. After Kant’s First Critique, Western thought in one form or another, maintained that the “subject” shaped the object. We thus enter Cultural/Epistemological Relativism and the Wittgensteinian Language Game.” Rationality was available in a received Language and there is no metanarrative from which to evaluate the categories of reality, this enters the educational revolution of multicultural/diversity/tolerance in our Multiversities (no long university).
This radical shift in thought, which becomes emphatic by the 1980s in Western culture and is particularly influential in the history and social science departments of the universities. Our radical post modern crisis in education stems from the consequences of the scientific revolution from Einstein, Plank, Heisenberg foreward and especially Goedel’s Theorem, which attacked the autonomy of mathematics which Russell and Whitehead’s Principia proposed. With the demise of Positivism in the physical sciences and Goedel’s refutation of autonomy of mathematics--the stage was set for our present post modern relativistic, pluralistic, humanistic and narcissistic culture (see my message, “Whose World Is It Anyhow?) Historically, the Judaeo/Christian God as creator of the universe, fell to the developments in astronomy; then physics, chemistry, biology, geology, etc., brought their sharp blades down on the Western cultural hegonomy. Now science (in the Anti Science Movements) is interpreted as Eurocentricism, gone wild and with it the “universal claims of The Christian Gospel” (No Other Name) where every language/ culture has its own rationality.
Now a word concerning Objectivity. Objectivity is the character of being an object of human conscious awareness (reality, ontic, contra Aristotlean metaphysics of Being). By reality, I mean “physical reality.” Thus every reality is a being but the possibility remains that the realm of being should turn out to be broader than the realm of reality. Whether or not this is so will depend on the existence and validity of heuristic structures which lead from the real, immanent by definition in the world, to be justifiable affirmation of being transcendent to the world.
Husserl calls them cogitalum (qua cogitalum) “objects for the transcendental phenomenologists” (his Cartesian Meditation, p. 37) It is not logically essential that this reduce to Idealism (only ideas are real), although it led Husserl in that direction. Husserl strives to avoid the closed circle of immanence. The strict object constructed by man’s cognitive activity is only intentionally identified with extramental reality, i.e., there is identity, not merely isomorphism, as many suppose as to hat is meant, but not as to being. The assertion to be “real” releases the object as constituted by the subject from its dependence on the subjects’ act of constitution of the object, thereby acknowledging that the extramental reality horizon is not the pure creation of the subject’s intentionality. This procedure can enable us to escape the principle of immanence (see esp. Edmund Husserl, Theorie der Raunkinstitution by U. Clagses (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1964)
Controversy Between Rationalism and Empiricism (Analytic/Synthetic Dichotomy)
Empirical objectivity (strict objectivity) which occupies its own space and possesses a certain (spatial) unity and permanence in time is called a body.
Public objectivity is the property of being an object for members of a given community. This recognition reveals intersubjectivity. The contrary of public objectivity is the privacy (subjectivity) which pertain to those objects of an individual subjects’ activity which cannot be shared with a general public, either because they cannot be linguistically expressed or because they do not constitute public and empirically established states of affairs in the community or establishable common world (see Husserl’s Cartesian Meditation, p. 5). When scientists call science objective, they usually mean intersubjective validity for the competent section of the scientific community; sometimes, however, the observer is also implied. This presents an extreme intersubjectivity of public objectivity. Western rationalism does not derive from Cartesian rationalism (eg. Mathematics--see esp. Newton’s Optics, 3rd edition (London, 1731, p. 344); the passage is cited in Metaphysical Foundations of Modern Physical Science by E.A. Burtt, (Routledge and Kegan Paul, 2nd edition, 1931), p. 258).
Objectivism is characteristic of the Newtonian and Cartesian mentality (e.g. it actually derives form the Judaeo/Christian concept of God as Creator/Redeemer of the universe) The rationality of the universe in the classical period of the development of science was grounded as “a reasonable universe,” ultimately caused by the rational God. Therefore science “decodes” reality and not post modern encoding--a’la’ Kantian constructivism and i.e. contextualization (see my essays on Contextualization and Rationality and Scientific Progress: Post Modern Demise of Rationality). Both Bohr and Einstein subscribe to “objectivity,” at least where macrophysics is concerned, and it is latent in much of the current discussion about objectivity, or rather the lack of it, in quantum mechanics and the Anti Science Movement.
The position that scientific horizons are horizons of thing-to-instrument--for subject is intermediate between Cartesian objectivity and the extreme of phenomenological subjectivism. Some reasons for rejecting objectivism are: (1) Every object is an object for a subject; that is, it is revealed by and proportioned to certain methods of inquiry which connotes a subject who inquires. Objective human knowledge is the outcome of valid human methods of inquiry. What it means to be an object of divine knowledge or an object for the absolute spirit is very much a mystery to us. (2) The obscure is not to be explained by the more obscure; in this case, scientific objectivity, which is a form of human objectivity, is not elucidated by bringing in the mystery of God’s objective knowledge of the earth. An “objective” account in the sense just mentioned was indeed the implied goal of many classical physicists; it was the Newtonian ideal (see op.cit. Newton’s Optics and Burtt’s Metaphysical Foundations of Modern Physical Science, p. 258). No problem arose as long as the means used to observe nature did entail convent calibration. The design and measuring instruments is a matter of ordinary physics, in between classical physics and quantum physics (see H. Margenau, “Measurements and Quantum States,” Philosophy of Science 30, 1963), pp. 183-57); J. Von Neumann, Mathematical Foundations of Quantum Mechanics (Princeton University Press, 1955); E. Wigner, “Problem of Measurement”, American Journal of Physics 3 (1963), p. 6ff.)
Both Margenau and Neumann claim that physical science is to describe what nature is like independently of any relationship it might acquire to the subject directly or to the instrumental arrangements which function as part of the measuring process. It is surely the measuring process reveals what is the case at the moment when the measurement is made whether or not it is possible in particular cases to extrapolate to earlier or later periods of time. This is the partial truth contained in Heisenberg’s insight that physics ought to concern itself solely with observation events and not with hypothetical unobservable structures. (Heisenberg’s own account of this insight is contained in “Erinnekungen anti Zeit der Ertwicklung der Quantenmechanik” in Theoretical Physics in the 20th Century: A Memorial Volume to Wolfgang Pauli,, ed. By M. Fiers and J.D. Weisskopt (NY: Interscience, 1960, pp. 40-47); and M. Bunge, “Physics and Reality” Dialectic 19 (1965), p. 204)--strongly objects in his conception, has attacked the view that physics is about measuring processes by pointing out that physics can only describe beyond laboratory, eg. “Crab Nebula”)
In the first place (1) the stationary states of an atom are determined by the boundary conditions which in turn represent the averaged effect of the physical environment with which the helium atom is in contact. (2) Transiting up from our down to the atoms’ fundamental release photons which travel through cosmic space and which eventually will be recorded and interpreted in an earthly laboratory; assertions about reality, then, are not formally assertions about the theoretical model, although they certainly presuppose antecedents, usually mathematical assertions about a theoretical model (cf. Realistic assertions have empirical content and are subject to empirical confirmability in principle (or falsifiable). Whenever then a theoretical model is used to make assertions about factual instances, a more or less latent or virtual statistical elements enter (see Paul A. Heelan, S.J., Quantum Mechanics and Objectivity (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1965, pp. 38-41; 101-109 and passim - vital).
Individual deviations from the ideal occur at random. These deviate as long s they are non systematic and are judged not to be significant. This does not mean that they are unreal or even small relative to the parameters of the system or to be available instrumentation but merely that they are devoid of intrinsic intelligibility; as a matter of act, and only terms of the systematic analysis in question, all deviations cluster around the theoretical model in a matter subject generally to a well-defined statistical distribution. As long as no system can be discerned in these deviations there is no evidence calling for a new paradigm/narrative or legitimization structure on the level of the categorical conclusions.
Our examination necessitates that we now turn to the “Theories of Scientific Revolutions” with attention to Kant, Lakatos, Carnap, Popper and Kuhn (Kuhn’s concept of Paradigm will be examined more extensively in a later section; and see my papers, “Kuhn’s Concept of Paradigm” ; see also my paper, “Christian Faith and Scientific Revolution: Problem of Demarcation in Kant and Popper;” The Post Modern Context of Theology: Intersubjective Mode” i.e., “radical contextualization”)
Scientific Revolutions: With Attention to
Kant, Lakatos, Carnap, Popper and Kuhn
These philosophers of science do not set gently to the enormous literature on the psychological/sociological explanation of the nature, significance and origins of scientific theories
Kuhn’s paradigm thesis was proposed in the context of a massive international debate about the relationship of sociology to epistemology. Can the history of science be the source of rational explanation of narrative displacement in the social context of the confusion over the relationship to empiricism and scientific theory/hypothesis. How do we understand the relationship of epistemology, scientific theories and narrative displacement? The development of “Western Science” is the bane of post modern anti science! Why? Perhaps a brief outline of the “Pluralistic Theory of Knowledge and Action” would shed more light than darkness on understanding the widespread hostility toward Western science because of it’s “Metanarrative” stance. Is Western science only a socially constructed perspective? If it is, then it has no universal application in our multiculturally diverse global village. The blade strikes across both the universally applicable scientific method and the “absolute claims” of the Judaeo/Christian narrative. Can the nature of science and missions/evangelism as “conversion” procedure rest in nothing but epistemological and cultural relativism?
How can there be a close fit between behavior and thinking? At the heart of post modern debate in science and the exclusive claims of the Christian Gospel is--is there “one correct picture of the world?” From Plato’s psychological mechanism, creating a state of firm and unwavering belief, gives an externally perspective account of such rites, and backs them by arguments to show the “absolute truth” of the story that he would have liked to be believed forever. The double machinery of psychological manipulation and philosophical argument was developed to perfection by the Roman Catholic Church (Christendom from the 5th to the 15th centuries).
Never again was there to be such a profound understanding of human nature and never again was this understanding used with such fatal effect for the physical and conceptual propagation of “Ideologies,” The paradigm shift in thought of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries differ from its ancestor in only two respect. The context of the doctrines defended differ from that of the preceding ideologies and the psychological manipulation is left to the individual.
The Creative Minds of Descartes and Bacon on Western Thought
Descartes and Bacon sought the correct psychological procedures for establishing unanimity as well as steadfastness in the pursuit of truth. Both giants developed a theory of idols and try to explain why man is so frequently deceived. Both devise methods of undeceiving him and both recognize that the transition to the “new philosophy” involves perhaps a rather long period of training that creates a mind capable of understanding the arguments and prepared to cling univocally to their results.
From Descartes and Bacon to the founders of modern science this procedure was developed. Galileo especially recognizes the need to prepare the mind of the reader so that he will be able to understand the “new astronomy” and to remain loyal to it even in the face of difficulties (e.g. anomalies). Both Descartes and Bacon are quite explicit in their opposition to “Common Sense” from the outset (e.g. origins of opposition to empiricism as a method to yield True Truth). [Note our heritage’s dependence on “Scottish Common Sense” in articulating the hermeneutic of our Restoration Heritage.]
After four centuries of scientific development, it is crystal clear that “Common Sense” is not the foundation of scientific advancement. It is true that Galileo utilized “Common Sense” and the psychological hold it has upon the individual to destroy the rest. Newton restricts himself to experiment and philosophical argument, but his theories soon became the basis for new and institutionalized means of creating unanimity. This is how “modern science,” or “nature” science comes into being. At this juncture Kuhn’s theory of paradigmatic revolution” enters the hard ball arena of scientific debate. Kuhn’s paradigm futilely attempts to escape the “Sociology of Knowledge Thesis” which lies deep in all but worldly influence in the pluralism of interpretive systems in our multicultural, relativistic post modern world. Kuhn’s theory shares many properties with primitive, mythological ideologies from animistic, pantheistic world view of most of our global village (ca. 75% are in Animism, Hinduism, Buddhism, Voodooism, Shintoism, New Age Occult phenomenon and most Anti Science, e.g., Capra, et. al.).
The influence is no longer limited to Eastern cultures, but it began to enter Western culture in the 19th and 20th centuries--development into cultural relativism via anthropology and sociology. The influence is no longer limited to comparative religion, sociology of religion, phenomenology of religion and history of religion schools especially English and German in origins. All this development began as the West began to engage the East. The counter culture of the 1960's was structured on Joseph Campbell’s “Power of Myth” (Science Fiction) and resurgent occult from the 1960's to 2000; also Marcuse, Toffler and Reich.
To not be prepared for this phenomenon by paradigmatic shifts in “Christian Education” is unpardonable. Any scientific theory that does not contribute to our understanding of the universe is unacceptable. Creative imagination, feelings vs. Appeal to mystery convey no guide whatever for understanding the reality of the universe. Is it possible to hold one’s “received view” of science or anything else and retain freedom of artistic creation and yet to utilize it in the advancement of our knowledge? The answer to this research procedure might have a pluralism of explanations as long as they were complimentary not contradictory scientific procedure.
The limits of ability and limits of their degree of adaptation is available only to the “successful” completion of the proposed task. The criterion is the survival when their predecessors fail (e.g., legal debates in the courtroom context). New evidence might throw new light on new facts that are fatal to the “received/established” position.
Legal procedure in judiciary systems have two sets of lawyers--defense and counter defense. The court decisions are often placed on the highest authority, i.e., specialists/experts. Decisions are not always bound to the prejudices of the professional. What is foundation for restrictions on the guardians of knowledge, be they scientists or philosophers? Here we often engage a pluralism of alternatives. How does the paradigm of decision making relate to the “scientific method?” Are there grounds for “acceptable” proliferation of the theory of observational results? Theories can be developed and improved and the relation to observation is also capable of modification. It took considerable time until the relation of the kinetic theory to the fact of irreversibility was truly understood. What unifying theory might all available experimental results support? It takes time for all interpretational idiosyncrasies to produce a common denominator. When there is scientific disagreement the theories which produce the most fruitful results is most rational.
Kant was perhaps the first major voice after the first scientific revolution to emphasize that experience as conceived by scientists contain theoretical elements and that observational reports lacking these elements are not to be identified into the body of scientific knowledge. It is ubiquitously acknowledged that sense data language is useless for the purpose of science and that useful observation reports must go beyond what is immediately seen. The sense data emphasis is by no means ignored, but it must be fused with additional hypothetic elements.
Dr. Imre Lakatos is a case in point. He is concerned with metaphysical components of observation. Observational terms can be defined without reference to theories referring to the phenomena. But observations are always guided by presuppositions of selection of X from among alternatives (I. Lakatos, “Criticism and The Methodology of Scientific Programmes,” in Lakatos and Musgrave’s work (eds.) Criticism and The Growth of Knowledge; and Robert G. Colodny, ed., Beyond The Edge of Certainty and his The Edge of Objectivity (Princeton University Press, 1966 printing); Larry Laudan, Progress and Its Problems: Towards A Theory of Scientific Growth (University of California Press, 1977); I.B. Cohen, Revolutions in Science (Harvard University Press, 1985).
Rudolf Carnap stated that the physical thing language contains the idea of observer independence, which entails that a fast motor of the observer in the neighborhood of Sirus will leave the observation data unaffected. Carnap’s idea is not only hypothetical but also metaphysical (i.e., as Berkeley had claimed earlier) because it is not possible to specify an experimental result that would endanger it and that might force us to give it up. Ordinary observation statements have metaphysical components.
According to Karl Popper, whose procedure most adequately reflects what is going on in the sciences; Theory X is scientific only if it has potential falsifiers, that is, only if there exists observational statements which are contradictory. In order to determine the truth value, one must employ auxiliary theories, e.g., the test of Newton’s celestial mechanics involves optical theory, theory of elasticity, physiology, chemistry, etc.. The strength of any test is provided by the number of falsifiers or if the falsifiers involve further auxiliary theories. However wide the tests and their potential falsifiers progress and infinite regress makes us admit that there is something without potential falsifiers. Every test involves metaphysical auxiliary assumptions! Only the Judaeo/ Christian creator/redeemer God, incarnate in Jesus Christ, can solve the necessity of infinite regress without metaphysical assumptions. Herein lies the strength of the Biblical Metanarrative! Aquinas’ arguments escaped infinite regress only by reference to “God.” Even Hume and Kant’s attack on the Biblical narrative cannot escape the irrationality of infinite regress (e.g., The Roman Catholic Church Vatican II embraced Kant as savior of post modern impasse). Never has there been a greater farce proposed by brilliant academicians since Satan’s question in the Garden of Eden--”Did God say that?”
Proliferation of the explanatory system must not be suppressed. Even the most outlandish products of the human brain and scientific method are necessary ingredients for the progress of True Science and True Truth! Any comparison and/or critique of alternatives requires a metanarrative from which to accept or reject the alternative explanatory systems. Dr. Yancy is surely correct--it is not that post modernism rejects moral and epistemological norms; it is that they leave no metanarrative from which to critique any proposed explanatory systems. But they are not without a received agenda! Solipsistic reductionism is no place from which to critique any agenda, including the Christian agenda.
A Sketch of The Changing Concepts of Scientific Revolutions
from the 18th to the 21st Century
These turning points in the History of Science must be kept before the reader at all times before we enter the post modern discussion of Thomas Kuhn’s concept of paradigm. All references in the following sketch will be taken from the book by I.B. Cohen, Revolution in Science (Harvard University Press, 1985).
Some of the changing concepts of revolution are visible in the creative minds of the 18th century--Transformations during the Enlightenment. Two events of violent social and political upheaval established the usage of the term ‘revolution’ in the 18th century--The American Revolution of 1776 and the French Revolution of 1789. The mid 18th century lacked a single, clear meaning for the word ‘revolution.’ This can be seen in the writings of Voltaire and in Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s Social Contract (1762). During this same time period there was a strong belief in a two-stage revolution--displace the old and replace it with something new.
Voltaire. The writings of Voltaire also bear out the thesis of ambiguity concerning the usage of the term revolution. His pertinent works during this period were Philosophical Letters or Letters Concerning The English Nation (1733), The Age of Louis XIV (1751), and Essay on The Manners and Mind of Nations (1756). His histories were translated into English, Spanish, Italian, German and Russian.
Revolution as Discontinuity and Change. Despite the widespread ambiguity, by mid-century the word was well on its way to standing primarily for a “great political change.” Buffon would use ‘revolution’ primarily in geology and Herder would speak of it in an anthropological development. The American Revolution contained elements of the old and new semantic distinctions for ‘revolution.’ It was a return to the rights and privileges of Englishmen promised 100 years earlier and it was a radical break with its dominant mother country, thus the word on the Seal of the United States--Novus Ordo Seclorum,” - “a new order of the ages.”
After the French Revolution the word ‘revolution’ lost all cyclical overtones, except in the astronomical sense. Hanna Arendt argued for the astronomical sense of the word for application to the French Revolution. She conjectured, “for the first time perhaps, the emphasis has entirely shifted from the lawfulness of a rotating, cyclical movement to its necessity.”
18th Century Conceptions of Scientific Revolution. The great Encyclopedie of Diderot and d’Alembert appeared in 1751. For a discussion of revolution in science the reader must turn to the supplemental writings of the Encyclopedie, especially an article by d’Alembert entitled “Experimental.” The two men share in tracing the achievements of Bacon and Descartes and paying special homage to Newton: “Newton succeeded in proving what his predecessors had only predicted--the true art of introducing mathematics into physics.” Diderot wrote on revolutions in science in his famous essay, “On The Interpretation of Nature” (1753). He held that between steps in revolution there are ‘maximum intervals between one revolution and another’ (fixed quantity of time). d’Alembert recognized, as did Max Planck two centuries later, the generational nature of revolutions.
Two Writers on Revolutions in Astronomy. During mid-century two authors wrote concerning revolutions in astronomy: Joseph Jerome le Francis de Lalande and Jean-Sylvain Bailly (who wrote three volumes on The History of Astronomy). Bailly is responsible for circulating the idea of a Copernican Revolution and for solidifying the idea of a “scientific revolution.”
Writers on Scientific Revolution at the End of the Century. French writers on scientific revolution abound in the 1780's. In the capacity of permanent secretary, Condorcet published his major work, Sketch For A Historical Picture of The Progress of The Human Mind (1795). This work examines the different causes of the American and French Revolutions. Three scientists of the 18th century referred to their work in terms of a ‘revolution’: Lavoisier, Symmer and Marat. The first overall review of the intellectual accomplishments of the 18th century was written by Samuel Miller, A Brief Retrospect of The Eighteenth Century.
Lavoisier and the Chemical Revolution. The Chemical Revolution is the first one to be so designated by its chief author, Antoine Laurent Lavoisier. This revolution occurred during the time of the American Revolution and reached its climax during the French Revolution. An interesting letter was written from Lavoisier to Benjamin Franklin on February 2, 1790 which contained a brief account of the revolution in Chemistry and an account of the political revolution in France (evidence of parallel semantic loads).
Lavoisier’s contribution--(1) awareness of the magnitude of his own efforts and ability to predict the resulting revolution; (2) reduction by investigation; element, compound, mixture/table of elements (vs. ‘Phlogiston’ theory) [neg. Result--POSITIVISM]; (3) creation of necessary nomenclature The Method of Chemical Nomenclature (1787). The major contribution came in Lavoisier’s analysis of the role of oxygen in the processes of combustion, calcination and respiration.
Acceptance of The Revolution. Almost at once Lavoisier’s chemical revolution was recognized in print. The author primarily responsible for this was Antoine Francois de Fourcroy. His complete theory can be found in his own Traite’ (1789) which was read at the public meeting of the Paris Academy of Science on 18 April 1787 by M. Lavoisier. His laboratory notes served to further establish the chemical revolution.
Kant’s Alleged Copernican Revolution. The Myth--Cohen lists eighteen examples (including K. Popper and B. Russell) from various works to show the universal acceptance of a belief in Kant’s Copernican Revolution. The only problem is the lack of Kant’s intention to accomplish this task. The two most prominent examples of propagating the myth are the 1929 Gifford Lectures and the Third International Kant Congress of 1970.
Kant’s views on revolution in science--Cohen says Kant is strictly a modern and not a traditionalist; by ‘revolution’ he does not mean ebb and flow or cyclical change, but a radical forward step that makes a clean and thorough break with the past.
Origins of the Myth--in context, Kant’s point is clearly that Copernicus had made a shift from the perspective of a stationary observer to that of a revolving observer; he had shown that a change occurs when one disengages the observer’s own motion from the observed or apparent motion of the sun, planets and stars.
In the preface of the second edition of the Critique, Kant uses the word ‘revolution.’ Cohen notes that this could cause some confusion and the false notion of a self-proclaimed Copernican Revolution; (Kant did say that his work was revolution-making). Between 1799 and 1825 at least four writers on Kantian philosophy stated publicly, in print or in lectures, that Kant himself either had desired or had undertaken a Copernican Revolution in philosophy.
The Changing Language of Revolution in Germany. The 19th century saw the development of the German language as it became the medium of international communication. In the 18th century, however, there was a contest between the French and German designation for ‘revolution’--at least ten different German words). German participants were Zedler, Adelung, Campe and Kant.
The Industrial Revolution. The major historiographic problem that the Industrial Revolution has in common with both the Scientific Revolution and other revolutions in science is to define exactly what is meant by the name; next comes the double question of when and in fact whether such a revolution occurred. The term was relatively common in France by the 1820's. Unlike political revolutions but like the Scientific Revolution, the Industrial Revolution was spread over a long period of time, covering some seven or eight decades in two centuries. The Industrial Revolution resembles the Scientific Revolution also in the way in which some historians have tended to see both revolutions as continuing processes. “The Industrial Revolution transformed man from a farmer-shepherd into a manipulator of machines worked by inanimate energy.” (Cipolla)
RATIONALITY AND REVOLUTION IN SCIENTIFIC PROGRESS
The following items are major voices in the post modern debate concerning the nature and development of science:
1. Is the theory internally consistent? This is determined by the conclusions the theory gives--how well do they correspond to reality and how do they compare with the conclusions of rival theories?
2. Is the theory authentically scientific in character? If the theory’s credibility can be tested by experimental data, it is valid. But it is invalid, as a theory, if found to be tautological in nature.
3. Is the theory able to generate scientific advancement? If the theory is perceived to be superior to rival theories in its ability to advance knowledge, then it can be found to be acceptable.
4. Is the theory sound in its conclusions when empirically applied? An example of this is when General Relativity was verified by the observation of starlight bending around the sun.
The Arts and Humanities Citation Index: The compilers of The Index examined the record for the years 1976-1983 and issued a report on the most cited works of the 20th century. The most cited author was Lenin, which speaks volumes on the state of the humanities in the West toward the end of the Cold War, but the most cited single works were, in reverse order: third place, Northrop Fyre’s Anatomy of Criticism; second, Joyce’s Ulysses; and well in the lead was Thomas Kuhn’s 1962 book, The Structure of Scientific Revolution.
Interest in Kuhn’s book has not waned. The Index is now online, and records one hundred citations to the book for 1999, plus another four hundred in The Social Sciences Citation Index. The tone of the citations is reverential. It is reported that Structure is Al Gore’s favorite book and William Safire’s New Political Dictionary has an article on “Paradigm Shift,” a phrase popularized by Kuhn, which reports both George Bush, Sr., and Clinton being impressed with its usefulness.
1. Is the theory accurate? If so, its deduced consequences will be in “demonstrated agreement with the results of existing experiments and observations.”
2. Is the theory consistent? If so, it will not only be inwardly consistent, but also harmonize with currently accepted theories.
3. Is the theory broad in scope? If so, then its consequences will “extend far beyond. . . what it was initially designed to explain.”
4. Is the theory simple? A simple theory that describes the same data as a complex theory is more desirable.
5. Is the theory able to reveal previously unknown phenomena/relationship? An example of this is the Big Bang theory which anticipated the presence of background radiation--discovered some years later.
For trends and fads in the humanities\kuhn.htm world, The Arts and Humanities Citation Index is impossible to improve on. The following information is vital: New Paradigm Thinking (http.//world.std.com/nlo/94.11/0114.html). Thomas Kuhn Theory of Scientific Revolutions (http.//www.lucknow.com/horus/guide/cm106.huml). Thomas Kuhn’s irrationalism by James Franklin, The New Criterion--Thomas Kuhn’s Irrationalism (http.//www.newcriterion.com/archive/18/junoo/kuhn.htm).
IMRE LAKATOS on Scientific Research Programs
1. A research program is progressive if: (1) it can predict novel facts [theoretically progressive]; (2) its predictions lead to empirical cooperation [empirically progressive].
2. A research program is degenerative “if its theoretical growth lags behind its empirical growth” [i.e., theories are constructed only to account for known facts].
A research program possesses a protective belt of auxiliary theories to fend off refutations from its “hard-core” sacred-theory [i.e., punctuated equilibrium is to protect macro evolution in the face of fossil record gaps].
1. Theories are road maps which are not necessarily true or false in some absolute way--they are useful for scientific endeavor. The value of a theory is not in how literally it corresponds to reality, but how useful it is.
JAMES W. JONES
1. Theories: (1) must be precise; (2) are selective; (3) are abstract--they do not perfectly occur in nature; (4) order and universalize experience; (5) must be internally consistent and compatible with standard knowledge; (6) are always prior to experience. Science selects certain aspects of experience as relative and translates experience into symbols.
IAN G. BARBOUR
1. Theories: (1) must agree with observations; (2) be internally consistent and coherent; (3) be comprehensive--to demonstrate underlying unity in diversity; (4) be able to suggest “new hypotheses, laws, concepts or experiments.
We must avoid at all costs confusing Description with Explanation in our encounter with the Narrative Displacement from The Enlightenment to Post Modernism. The mere use of phonemes and words like pre, anti, modern, etc., only describe narrative displacement; it cannot explain why or what caused the displacement. There is widespread use of these descriptive terms in Christian and non Christian contexts. This approach in no manner is an intellectual encounter with all the resident “isms”.
Every Thought Captive (II Corinthians 10.4) Post Modernism threatens to discredit modernism and theism alike. Post modernism means “after modernism.” “Post modernists believe that things like reason, rationality and confidence in science are cultural biases. They content that those who trust reason and things based on reason like science, Western education and governmental structures . . . unknowingly act out their European cultural conditioning, thus conditioning seeks to keep power in the hands of the social elite.” Our challenge is to understand (1) Christian theism; (2) Modernism; and (3) Post Modernism.
Bibliography for Paradigms of Scientific Revolution
Enrico Bellone, A World on Paper: Studies on The Scientific Revolution (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press), 1980).
Paul Boller, American Thought in Transition: The Impact of Evolutionary Materialism, 1865-1900 (Chicago, IL: Rand McNally, 1969).
Louis Bredvoid, The Brave New World of The Enlightenment (University of Michigan Press, 1961).
Paul Carter, “The Idea of Progress in Most Recent Protestant Thought” 1930-1960, Church History xxii (1962), pp. 75-86.
D.G. Cedarbaum, “Paradigms,” Studies in History and Philosophy of Science (14:173-213) 1983.
A.S.. Cohan, Theories of Revolution (London: Nelson) 1975.
I.B. Cohen, The Newtonian Revolution )Cambridge University Press) 1980).
Cohen, Revolution in Science (Belknop Press Harvard University) 1985.
A.C. Crombie, “Historians and Scientific Revolution” Physics (11.162-180) 1969.
P. Fougeyrolles, Marx, Freud, et.al. revolution totale (Paris, 1972).
Peter Gay, The Enlightenment: An Interpretation, The Rise of Modern Paganism , vol. I (NY: A.A. Knoff, 1966); also The Enlightenment, The Science of Freedom, vol. II (NY: Knoff, 1969)
F. Gilbert, “Revolution,” DHI (NY: Scribners) vol. 4, 1973, pp. 152-167).
John C. Greene, Darwin and The Modern Mind (Baton Rouge, LA: University Press, 1961)
G. Gutting (ed.) Paradigms and Revolutions (University of Notre Dame Press) 1980.
Ian Hacking, ed., Scientific Revolutions (NY: Oxford University Press,) 1981.
Gertrude Himmerfarb, Darwin and The Darwinian Revolution (Norton Library, 1959).
Margaret C. Jacobs, The Newtonian and English Revolution of 1689-1720 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1976).
Alfred Kazin, “The Freudian Revolution Analyzed.” The Freudian Paradigm: Psychoanalysis and Scientific Thought (Chicago: Nelson Hall) 1977, pp. 76-84)
I Krammick, “Reflections on Revolution: Definition and Explanation in Recent Scholarship.” History and Theory (11.26-63) 1972.
Thomas Kuhn, The Copernican Revolution (Harvard University Press) 1957.
Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (University of Chicago Press, 1962, revised edition 1970).
Kuhn, “Second Thoughts on Paradigms” Structures of Scientific Theories (University of Illinois Press, 2nd ed., 1977).
K. Lakatos and A. Musgrave, editors, Criticism and The Growth of Knowledge (Cambridge University Press), 1965.
Larry Laudan, Progress and Its Problems (University of California Press), 1977.
Md. Mujeeb-ur-Rhaman, ed., The Freudian Paradigm: Psychoanalysis and Scientific Thought (Chicago: Nelson-Hall) 1970.
Wilhelm Norlind, “Copernicus and Luther: A Critical Study” Isis (44: 273-276) 1953.
Nathan Reingold, “Through Paradigm Land to A Normal History of Science” Social Studies of Sciences (10: 475-496).
Marthe Robert, The Psychoanalytic Revolution (NY: Harcourt, Brace and World) English Translation, 1966.
James A. Rogers, “Darwinian and Social Darwinism,” Journal of The History of Ideas 33 (1972), pp. 265.288.
Herbert W. Schneider, “The Influence of Darwin and Spengler in American Philosophical Theology,” Journal of The History of Ideas 6 (1945), pp. 3-18.
S. Toulmin, “Conceptual Revolutions in Science” Boston Studies in The Philosophy of Science (3.331-347) 1968.
G. Vesey, “Kant’s Copernican Revolution: Speculative Philosophy” The Age of Revolutions - Units15-16 (Open University Press), 1972.
Jules Vuillemim, L’heritage kantien ete la revolution Copernicienne (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France) 1954.
Edgar Zilsel, “The Genesis of The Concept of Scientific Progress” Journal of The History of Ideas (6.325-349) 1945.